OPINION:
Waves of Russian drone attacks are being launched to delay and disrupt Ukraine’s already delayed spring offensive and to use up Ukraine’s air defenses. A May 3 attack on Moscow has attracted more attention than the rest.
At about 3 o’clock that morning, two unmanned aerial vehicles — drones — flew close to the Kremlin and were shot down by Russian security forces. Russia claims that the Ukrainians were guilty of a terrorist attack and tried to kill President Vladimir Putin, who wasn’t in the Kremlin at the time. Ukraine claims that the Russians mounted the attack themselves. Both sides have denied responsibility.
It’s possible that Ukraine was responsible for that attack. Moscow is less than 500 miles from Kyiv. Had the Ukrainians succeeded by significantly damaging the Kremlin, it would have been a major blow to Russian morale.
But it was more likely a Russian false-flag operation, entirely consistent with prior Soviet/Russian strategy.
We should remember that in 1999, when Mr. Putin came to power, a series of bombings in Moscow, supposedly carried out by Chechen terrorists, killed over 200 people. It is very likely that Russian security services carried out those attacks, which Mr. Putin then used as an excuse to launch his bloody war against Chechnya.
The May 3 attack precipitated significant threats from Russia. The Russian Foreign Ministry said that “all those responsible for the strikes on the Kremlin will be found, they will face severe and inevitable punishment.” Dimitry Medvedev, former Russian president and leader of the country’s security council, said, “After today’s terrorist attack, there are no options left other than the physical elimination of Zelenskyy and his clique.”
The Russians would love to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who has become an international symbol of Ukrainian courage against Russian aggression. After 15 months of war, Mr. Putin’s forces are struggling to find a way to win.
One of the biggest surprises of the Russian war on Ukraine has been the inability of Russian forces to establish air supremacy. Ukraine has effectively used air defense missiles and its fighter aircraft to deny Russia control of its skies. On May 6, Ukraine claimed (and the Pentagon later confirmed) that it used a U.S.-supplied Patriot missile to shoot down a Russian hypersonic missile. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s air defenses soon may not be able to maintain their denial of Russian air dominance.
Since October, Russian drone and missile strikes have caused Ukraine to use up a large number of air defense missiles. They are being resupplied, but that effort may not be enough if Russia decides to launch its own offensive to thwart any Ukrainian counterattack, forcing Ukraine to choose whether to defend its forces or its cities. In that event, Ukraine’s air defense missiles may prove too few in number. Its fighter aircraft certainly are.
In the longer term, victory for either side may come down to whether NATO is willing or able to give Ukraine a significant force of fighter aircraft and whether Ukraine has enough pilots to fly them.
Poland and Slovakia have already sent Ukraine eight MiG-29 fighter aircraft, a type that Ukrainian pilots have flown for decades. NATO leaders and President Biden are debating whether U.S. F-16s or Swedish Gripen fighters should also be sent.
The problem is that it would take months to train Ukrainian pilots to operate those fighters and probably longer to train Ukrainian maintenance personnel. That cannot be accomplished before Ukraine‘s long-delayed spring counteroffensive.
Sweden has reportedly sold about 65 Gripens to other nations while retaining a force of only about 100 for itself. We have built more than 4,000 F-16s, which are operated by our Air Force and many allies around the world. No nation is lining up to donate Gripens or F-16s to Ukraine. That raises the question of whether Ukraine has enough pilots to man new aircraft.
The Russians have their own problems, and one of the biggest is Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder and commander of the mercenary Wagner Group.
On May 6, Mr. Prighozin threatened to withdraw his forces from Ukraine. He first said that “after seven months of the Bakhmut meat-grinder, the Wagner Group has lost its combat potential.” He recanted a day later, saying that the Russian defense ministry had promised to supply the Wagner forces with the arms and ammunition it needs to continue fighting in Bakhmut.
Mr. Prighozin is careful to stay onside with Mr. Putin, a longtime ally. But he also wants to succeed Mr. Putin. Mr. Putin, as this column has stated before, is unlikely to live to see the end of his Ukraine war. But his death — given the people likely to succeed him — would not necessarily mean peace in Ukraine, but rather a redoubling of Russia’s campaign to conquer it.
That war could come to a sudden end if Ukraine’s air defenses fail because Russian air supremacy would result all too quickly in a Russian victory. So, too, could a Russian-engineered assassination of Mr. Zelenskyy.
If Russia fails to establish air supremacy, and the Ukrainian counteroffensive — if it ever occurs — succeeds in driving the Russians out of the Donbas region, a peace agreement could be reached. But those “ifs” are too big to bet on.
• Jed Babbin is a national security and foreign affairs columnist for The Washington Times and contributing editor for The American Spectator.
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